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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Under the Hyde Amendment, a prevailing defendant in a 
federal criminal prosecution can apply to have his attorney’s 
fees and costs covered by the government.  Such an award is 
appropriate only if the defendant shows that “the position of 
the United States” in the prosecution “was vexatious, frivolous, 
or in bad faith.”  Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 
2519 (1997) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A app.).  That stand-
ard is demanding, and it requires far-reaching prosecutorial 
misconduct affecting the criminal case “as an inclusive whole.”  
United States v. Manzo, 712 F.3d 805, 810 (3d Cir. 2013).  
Short of that standard, the Hyde Amendment is not an 
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appropriate vehicle to criticize the conduct of law enforcement 
officers or second-guess the management of a criminal prose-
cution. 
The District Court here awarded attorney’s fees and costs 
under the Hyde Amendment to Mario Nelson Reyes-Romero, 
who was prosecuted for unlawful reentry in violation of 
8 U.S.C. § 1326, on the grounds that the prosecution was friv-
olous and in bad faith.  Although assuredly born of good inten-
tions and understandable frustration with faulty processes in 
the underlying removal proceeding here, that award was not 
based on the type of pervasive prosecutorial misconduct with 
which the Amendment is concerned.  Accordingly, we will re-
verse. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The relevant background can be divided into three stages.  
First, Reyes-Romero, a noncitizen,1 was subject to an admin-
istrative removal proceeding and removed from the country.  
Second, he returned to the United States and was prosecuted 
for unlawful reentry, a charge that he collaterally attacked un-
der 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) and that the District Court ultimately 
dismissed.  Third, he sought and was awarded attorney’s fees 
and costs under the Hyde Amendment.  Because a complete 
understanding of this history is crucial for analyzing the ques-
tion presented, we discuss each stage in some detail. 
 
1 We follow the Supreme Court’s lead in using the term 
“noncitizen” to “refer to any person who is not a citizen or na-
tional of the United States.”  Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 
2105, 2110 n.1 (2018).   
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A. 2011 Administrative Removal Proceeding 
Reyes-Romero, an El Salvadoran national, entered the 
United States unlawfully in 2004.  In 2008, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings on 
the ground that he was “present in the United States without 
[having] be[en] admitted or paroled,” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  A year later, after Reyes-Romero pleaded 
guilty to aggravated assault in New Jersey state court,2 DHS 
aborted the § 1182 proceeding and placed him in expedited ad-
ministrative removal on the ground that his conviction consti-
tuted an “aggravated felony,” 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(1), namely a 
“crime of violence,” id. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (incorporating 
18 U.S.C. § 16’s definition). 
In 2011, DHS officers Trushant Darji and Jose Alicea con-
ducted Reyes-Romero’s administrative removal proceeding.  
The officers first served him with a Form I-826, which sets out 
a “Notice of Rights and Request for Disposition.”  App. 180.  
It is unclear why they did so, as the I-826 does not apply to 
noncitizens in expedited removal because of an aggravated fel-
ony conviction.  For instance, the I-826 instructed Reyes-
Romero he “ha[d] the right to a hearing before the Immigration 
Court,” id., even though administrative removal is conducted 
 
2 The statute under which Reyes-Romero was convicted 
makes it a second-degree felony to “[a]ttempt[] to cause seri-
ous bodily injury to another, or cause[] injury purposely or 
knowingly or under circumstances manifesting extreme indif-
ference to the value of human life recklessly cause[] such in-
jury.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-1(b)(1).  He was sentenced to 
time served (397 days) and three years’ supervised release. 
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by immigration officers outside of the Immigration Court, see 
8 U.S.C. § 1228(a)(3), (b)(1).  Adding to the confusion, two 
boxes on the I-826 corresponding with contradictory declara-
tions were checked, indicating Reyes-Romero had both “re-
quest[ed] a hearing before the Immigration Court” to deter-
mine his right to remain in the country and had “give[n] up 
[his] right to a hearing” so he could be returned to El Salvador.  
App. 180. 
The officers then presented Reyes-Romero with the appli-
cable form—a Form I-851, the “Notice of Intent to Issue a Fi-
nal Administrative Removal Order” that governs noncitizens 
who are charged with having committed an aggravated felony.  
App. 96–97.  The I-851 informed Reyes-Romero of the 
grounds for expedited removal, his ability to contest those 
grounds, and the option to raise any “fear [of] persecution” re-
lated to his return to El Salvador.  Id.  That form indicated 
Reyes-Romero conceded removability, “acknowledge[d] that 
[he was] not eligible for any form of relief from removal,” and 
waived judicial review.  App. 97.  But close examination of the 
I-851 reveals it to be irregular.  Reyes-Romero apparently ex-
ecuted the waiver of his rights at 9:00 AM—twenty minutes 
before the time stamp next to a certification that the form had 
been translated into Spanish for his benefit and forty minutes 
before the time stamp accompanying the relevant DHS super-
visor’s issuing signature. 
Reyes-Romero received a final administrative removal or-
der that afternoon and was later removed to El Salvador. 
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B. Unlawful Reentry Prosecution 
Reyes-Romero returned to the United States without in-
spection and, after he was found and detained, a federal grand 
jury returned an indictment charging him with unlawful reentry 
in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.  He did not contest any of the 
elements of that offense—that he had been “removed” and was 
later “found in” the country without express consent, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1326(a).   
Instead, Reyes-Romero moved to dismiss the indictment 
under a statutory provision allowing him to “challenge the va-
lidity of the [removal] order” on which the prosecution was 
based, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d).  Under § 1326(d), a defendant bears 
the burden of showing that (1) he “exhausted any administra-
tive remedies that may have been available to seek relief 
against the [removal] order”; (2) the removal proceedings “im-
properly deprived [him] of the opportunity for judicial re-
view”; and (3) the “entry of the [removal] order was fundamen-
tally unfair.”  Richardson v. United States, 558 F.3d 216, 223 
(3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(1)–(3)).  “Funda-
mentally unfair” means “both [(a)] that some fundamental er-
ror occurred and [(b)] that as a result of that fundamental error 
[the defendant] suffered prejudice.”  United States v. 
Charleswell, 456 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2006).   
Reyes-Romero’s motion advanced two arguments.  First, 
the 2011 administrative removal proceeding, with its contra-
dictory forms and the “inconsisten[t]” selections on the I-826, 
“had an impermissible tendency to mislead” him and invali-
dated any waiver of his rights.  App. 71.  Second, the proceed-
ing was “fundamentally unfair” because he had not committed 
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an aggravated felony and therefore was entitled to a full hear-
ing before an immigration judge (IJ).3  App. 72.   
The Government resisted on both fronts.  In its view, 
Reyes-Romero’s I-851 waiver was valid and overcame any in-
consistency on the I-826, and as a result he had failed to ex-
haust administrative remedies or seek judicial review as re-
quired by § 1326(d)(1) and (2).  And in any event he failed to 
show prejudice as required by § 1326(d)(3) because he had not 
demonstrated “a reasonable likelihood that the result”—i.e., 
the removal order—“would have been different” but for the er-
rors he identified.  App. 225 (quoting Charleswell, 456 F.3d at 
362).   
The District Court held a hearing on the § 1326(d) motion.  
It first addressed the I-851 waiver and its effect on § 1326(d)’s 
 
3 In Baptiste v. Attorney General, 841 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 
2016)—a case involving the same offense of which Reyes-
Romero was convicted—we held that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), the 
“residual” clause of the federal crime-of-violence definition, is 
void for vagueness.  841 F.3d at 615–21.  Baptiste’s reasoning 
was ultimately embraced by the Supreme Court in Sessions v. 
Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1210 (2018).  But Baptiste avoided 
the question whether New Jersey second-degree aggravated as-
sault qualifies as a crime of violence under § 16(a), the crime-
of-violence definition’s “elements” clause.  841 F.3d at 606 
n.4.  As discussed below, that question turns on whether a state 
crime capable of commission by reckless conduct can categor-
ically satisfy the elements clause, an issue that remains unre-
solved.  See Borden v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) 
(granting certiorari on this issue). 
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exhaustion and judicial-review requirements.  The Court ex-
pressed concerns not only with the “inconsistent” nature of the 
I-826 and I-851 forms but also with the I-851’s time stamps 
suggesting Reyes-Romero had been informed of his rights af-
ter signing the waiver—an argument Reyes-Romero had not 
developed in his brief.  The Court told Adam Hallowell, the 
Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) prosecuting the case, 
that the Government was “in a deep hole” because the immi-
gration forms were “facially at odds with themselves.”  
App. 283.   
The Government called Officers Darji and Alicea as wit-
nesses.  Each had no memory of Reyes-Romero or his proceed-
ing and had handled a substantial number of immigration cases 
in the years since 2011, so they testified only to general prac-
tices.  Darji explained that he often worked with native Spanish 
speakers like Alicea to serve immigration forms on noncitizens 
in DHS custody.  Noncitizens charged with having committed 
aggravated felonies would first receive the “more general” 
I-826 form before receiving the I-851 form “specific to admin-
istrative removal.”  App. 294.  The noncitizen would typically 
“hold the pen” and make necessary selections.  App. 291.  If 
the noncitizen made contradictory or nonsensical selections, 
the officers would confirm his intent but otherwise leave those 
selections untouched. 
The District Court, interposing its own questions at the 
hearing, pressed Officer Darji about Reyes-Romero’s forms: 
THE COURT:  . . . [A]m I reading the[se forms] accu-
rately that within moments of 9 o’clock in the morning 
on June 23rd, 2011, several things had occurred pretty 
much all at once.  This defendant was told he had a right 
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to request a hearing.  He requested a hearing.  He said 
he didn’t want a hearing.  And he was told he couldn’t 
have a hearing.  Am I reading those forms correctly, sir? 
THE WITNESS:  Yes. 
THE COURT:  Does that make any sense at all to you, 
sir? 
THE WITNESS:  No, Your Honor. 
App. 331.  The District Court took Officer Darji’s response to 
mean that “the process that was used” in Reyes-Romero’s re-
moval proceeding did not “ma[k]e . . . sense.”  App. 476.   
Based on that concession and the defects in Reyes-
Romero’s forms, the District Court made clear it was “highly 
likely . . . [to] conclude that there was no voluntary and intelli-
gent waiver” and therefore that “the first two prongs of 
[§ 1326(d)] will have been fulfilled.”  App. 474–75. 
The parties’ attention therefore turned to the “only open is-
sue”: prejudice.  App. 543.  At first, Reyes-Romero repeated 
the argument he had advanced in his brief: that the misidenti-
fication of his crime of conviction as an aggravated felony it-
self constituted prejudice.  But after the District Court pressed 
him about “the reasonable likelihood of some different result” 
in the removal proceeding, App. 442, he switched gears, argu-
ing that he could have sought asylum or withholding of re-
moval.  To bolster that novel argument, he offered testimony 
from relatives who had suffered abuses in El Salvador or in 
neighboring Honduras.  Seeking more support, Reyes-Romero 
requested his relatives’ A-files, and the parties set out on a mul-
tiweek process to get them from DHS.  The Court held Reyes-
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Romero’s motion while that process was underway and re-
quested supplemental briefing to be filed once it was complete.   
While his § 1326(d) motion was pending, Reyes-Romero 
moved for bond.  The District Court expressed concern that, 
were Reyes-Romero to be released, DHS officials would detain 
him, reinstate the 2011 removal order, and remove him to El 
Salvador.  The Court also wondered aloud whether DHS would 
take different action if Reyes-Romero were released after the 
Government had “move[d] to dismiss the indictment,” 
App. 566.   
The Government soon came back with a surprise: a motion 
to dismiss the indictment with prejudice under Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 48.4  It explained that based on the evi-
dence at the first hearing “and on additional factual information 
that ha[d] come to [its] attention” since then, dismissal was “in 
the interests of justice.”  App. 603.  In another surprise, Reyes-
Romero opposed the Government’s motion, contending the 
District Court should grant it only if it also intervened in future 
immigration proceedings by expressly “barr[ing] [the Govern-
ment] from removing [him] on the basis of the [2011 removal] 
[o]rder.”  App. 608. 
When the parties convened for a hearing to address the 
Government’s motion to dismiss, the Government clarified 
that the “additional . . . information” to which it had referred 
came from Reyes-Romero’s relatives’ A-files, some of which 
“support[ed] the testimony” he had offered in support of relief 
 
4 “The government may, with leave of court, dismiss an in-
dictment . . . .”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a).   
11 
 
 
 
 
 
from removal.  App. 645.  The Government’s decision to seek 
dismissal, it explained, was based on the “litigation risk to th[e] 
[§ 1326(d)] affirmative defense” and the “time and expense” 
necessary to continue the prosecution.  App. 646.  But the Dis-
trict Court was hesitant, asking the Government whether 
Reyes-Romero risked detention or removal even after dismis-
sal with prejudice, to which the Government replied that it 
“c[ould] [not] speak for DHS,” App. 617.  The Court also noted 
its views that the DHS officers’ testimony had been “bizarre” 
and possibly untruthful, App. 634–35, and that Reyes-
Romero’s 2011 removal “was not . . . consistent with the high-
est traditions of the American legal system,” App. 657.  Still, 
the Court made clear it was not accusing the prosecution “of 
any wrongdoing whatsoever,” App. 634, and suggested the 
Government’s decision not to proceed with the prosecution 
was “how we want the system to work,” App. 635. 
Yet when the hearing resumed the next day, the District 
Court’s assessment had evolved.  It now expressed the view 
that the DHS officers’ testimony was not just “bizarre,” but a 
mix of “lies” and “law enforcement outrageousness.”  
App. 677.  And it recalled Officer Darji’s answer to its line of 
questioning to have meant not just that “the process . . . used” 
in the removal proceeding did not “ma[k]e any sense,” 
App. 476, but that “his [own] testimony made no sense,” 
App. 678 (emphasis added).  Most significant, the Court no 
longer deemed AUSA Hallowell blameless, but as needing to 
make a “choice” about whether he would “continue to rely on 
th[e] [officers’] testimony.”  App. 678–79.  Even if the prose-
cution was not responsible for errors in the removal proceed-
ing, it said, there “come[s] a point where” the Government 
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“adopt[s]” those errors as its own.  App. 679.  The Court again 
held all motions open pending further briefing.   
In an effort to respond to the concerns voiced by the District 
Court, the Government filed a supplemental brief raising two 
points:  First, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to condition 
a Rule 48 dismissal on the actions of an independent depart-
ment—here, on DHS’s forgoing future removal proceedings 
based on the 2011 order.  Second, the Government made un-
ambiguous that it was not “rely[ing] on or adopt[ing]” the DHS 
officers’ testimony and was no longer contesting any element 
of the § 1326(d) defense “other than the issue of prejudice.”  
App. 755. 
But the Government’s brief came with yet another surprise.  
At the start of the prosecution, the U.S. Attorney’s Office had 
received black-and-white copies of Reyes-Romero’s A-file 
from DHS and had shared those files with Reyes-Romero’s 
counsel.  Neither counsel had previously asked to inspect the 
originals.  But before filing its supplemental brief, the prose-
cution obtained the original documents, which revealed that the 
two inconsistent checks on the I-826—one requesting a hear-
ing, the other waiving it—were made in different colors.  And 
based on the ink color, it appeared the DHS officer who signed 
the form had filled in the box corresponding to Reyes-
Romero’s waiver of rights.  Even more odd, the waiver box 
featured a blue mark drawn over a pre-printed black “x,” sug-
gesting the DHS officers had given Reyes-Romero a pre-filled 
form.  AUSA Hallowell immediately disclosed the color ver-
sions of the documents to Reyes-Romero’s counsel and to the 
Court.   
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After reviewing the color copies, the District Court was 
“more convinced than ever” that the DHS officers’ testimony 
was a “combination of nonsense . . . [and] lies.”  App. 792.  
And it continued to criticize the prosecution.  The Court took 
issue, for instance, with AUSA Hallowell’s repeated state-
ments that, as an AUSA assigned to a criminal prosecution, he 
could not unilaterally bind DHS to a specific course of conduct 
in future immigration proceedings.  It also criticized the Gov-
ernment for not adequately “disclaim[ing]” the DHS officers’ 
testimony:  
MR. HALLOWELL:  Your Honor, we are saying that 
we will not rely on that testimony moving forward in 
this case. 
THE COURT:  Why?  Why won’t you rely on it? 
MR. HALLOWELL:  Your Honor, we don’t feel that 
that testimony can support a verdict for the Government 
on the first two prongs of [§ 1326(d)]. 
THE COURT:  If believed, it’s legally insufficient?  Or 
I shouldn’t believe it? 
MR. HALLOWELL:  We understand that Your Honor 
will make the final decision as to whether that testimony 
could be believed or not. . . . 
THE COURT:  Well, I understand that.  I’m asking the 
lawyer for the United States of America, should I be-
lieve that testimony? 
MR. HALLOWELL:  Your Honor, you should give it 
as much weight as you see fit. 
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App. 795, 797.  In the Court’s view, AUSA Hallowell’s refusal 
to “take a[] position” on the testimony conflicted with his ob-
ligations as a prosecutor.  App. 798–99.  And the District Court 
suggested that the Government had moved to dismiss in “bad 
faith” to ensure DHS officials could use the 2011 order in fu-
ture immigration proceedings against Reyes-Romero rather 
than instituting a new removal proceeding through service of a 
notice to appear (NTA).  App. 822–24.  
In response, the Government pointed out that months ear-
lier, DHS officials had attempted to do just that, offering 
Reyes-Romero an NTA that would have led to new proceed-
ings before an IJ rather than reinstatement of the 2011 admin-
istrative removal order.  But Reyes-Romero had rejected it.  He 
gave two reasons for having done so: a theory that the Govern-
ment’s choice to prosecute him for unlawful reentry precluded 
it from starting new removal proceedings5 and a desire to 
 
5 In support, Reyes-Romero cited several district court 
opinions holding that if a noncitizen is prosecuted for a crimi-
nal offense and is granted pretrial release, he cannot be seized 
by DHS officials under an immigration detainer during the 
criminal proceeding.  E.g., United States v. Hernandez-Bour-
dier, No. 16-cr-222-2, 2017 WL 56033, at *11 (W.D. Pa. 
Jan. 5, 2017).  That line of cases is contrary to what we and our 
sister circuits have had to say on the matter, see, e.g., United 
States v. Soriano Nunez, 928 F.3d 240, 247–27 (3d Cir. 2019); 
United States v. Lett, 944 F.3d 467, 470–71 (2d Cir. 2019) (col-
lecting decisions and joining the consensus), and in any event, 
nothing in those cases suggests the decision to bring a § 1326 
prosecution forfeits DHS’s right to pursue immigration 
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ensure that the District Court would reach the merits of his 
§ 1326(d) motion.   
With the District Court’s continued deferral of a ruling, the 
parties filed supplemental briefing on prejudice.  Reyes-
Romero’s supplemental brief expanded the argument that but 
for the defects in his 2011 removal proceeding, there was “a 
reasonable likelihood,” Charleswell, 456 F.3d at 362, that he 
would have received asylum, withholding of removal, or pro-
tection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).  The 
Government responded that Reyes-Romero was ineligible for 
asylum because his assault conviction qualified as an aggra-
vated felony; that he was ineligible for withholding of removal 
because the assault offense was a “particularly serious crime,” 
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii); and that he was not reasonably 
likely to prevail in seeking CAT protection or any other form 
of relief from removal.  In his reply brief, Reyes-Romero un-
earthed a new argument: dicta from Charleswell, an early de-
cision on § 1326(d), suggesting “[t]here may be some cases 
where the agency’s violations of a [noncitizen’s] rights [ar]e so 
flagrant, and the difficulty of proving prejudice so great, that 
prejudice may be presumed.”  456 F.3d at 362 n.17 (citation 
omitted). 
The District Court ultimately granted Reyes-Romero’s 
§ 1326(d) motion.  It ruled that the I-826 and I-851 forms were 
“shams” and that any waiver on those forms was invalid; that, 
“in light of the invalid waivers,” any failure to exhaust admin-
istrative remedies or seek judicial review as required by 
 
proceedings against the noncitizen after the criminal prosecu-
tion ends.   
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§ 1326(d)(1) and (2) must be excused; that the irregularities in 
Reyes-Romero’s removal proceeding constituted fundamental 
errors; and that those errors caused him prejudice, both because 
his claims for relief from removal were reasonably likely to 
succeed and because “the procedural defects were so cen-
tral . . . that prejudice must be presumed” under footnote 17 of 
Charleswell.  The Court therefore granted Reyes-Romero’s 
motion to dismiss “on the merits.”  App. 1028.  Doing so, the 
Court explained, would “serve[] to limit [Reyes-Romero’s] ex-
posure to future” immigration proceedings “reliant on the . . . 
2011” order.  App. 1031.   
Given that disposition, the District Court denied as moot 
Reyes-Romero’s pending motion for bond.  But it did not do 
the same with the Government’s pending motion to dismiss.  
Instead, it took the “unusual” step, App. 1030, of proceeding 
to analyze the Government’s motion on the merits and denying 
it as “clearly contrary to manifest public interest.”  Id. (quoting 
In re Richards, 213 F.3d 773, 787 (3d Cir. 2000)).  The Court 
found that the Government’s subjective motivation for its mo-
tion to dismiss was a desire to guarantee that DHS could rely 
on the 2011 removal order in future immigration proceedings.  
That motivation, it explained, “taint[ed]” the Government’s ef-
fort to have the case dismissed.  App. 1032–33.  Similarly 
problematic, the Court continued, was the Government’s “tak-
ing . . . a noncommittal position as to the credibility of” Offic-
ers Darji and Alicea, which the Court deemed inconsistent with 
the Government’s duty to correct a witness’s statement that is 
“obvious[ly]” untrue.  App. 1037–38 (quoting United States v. 
Harris, 498 F.2d 1164, 1169 (3d Cir. 1974)).   
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The District Court thus dismissed the indictment with prej-
udice.  The Government did not appeal the District Court’s rul-
ings on the motions to dismiss or the order of dismissal.6 
C. Hyde Amendment Application 
Following that dismissal, Reyes-Romero timely applied to 
the District Court for attorney’s fees and costs under the Hyde 
Amendment.7  Relying heavily on the findings in the Court’s 
 
6 After the dismissal, DHS officers served Reyes-Romero 
with an NTA, initiating new removal proceedings in Immigra-
tion Court.  Before the IJ, Reyes-Romero conceded removabil-
ity but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, CAT relief, 
and cancellation of removal.  The IJ denied his applications and 
ordered him removed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA) dismissed his appeal.  His petition for review before the 
Sixth Circuit remains pending.  Reyes-Romero v. Barr, No. 19-
03784 (6th Cir. Aug. 15, 2019). 
7 Hyde Amendment awards are subject to “the procedures 
and limitations . . . under section 2412 of title 28,” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3006A app., one of which is that the application must be filed 
“within thirty days of final judgment,” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2412(d)(1)(B).  That thirty-day deadline “begins when the 
government’s right to appeal the order has lapsed.”  Johnson v. 
Gonzales, 416 F.3d 205, 208 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).  
Here, the District Court granted Reyes-Romero’s motion to 
dismiss the indictment on July 2, 2018; the Government’s win-
dow to appeal closed on August 1, 2018, see Fed. R. App. 
P. 4(b)(1)(B); and Reyes-Romero moved for a Hyde Amend-
ment award on August 7, 2018.   
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opinion resolving the parties’ motions to dismiss, Reyes-
Romero argued the Government had pursued an “egregious” 
prosecution that was “vexatious, frivolous, [and] in bad faith.”  
App. 1052–53 (citation omitted).   
The District Court awarded Reyes-Romero fees and costs, 
a decision it reached in five steps:  First, because the Govern-
ment did not appeal the order resolving the motions to dismiss, 
the Court deemed any “findings and conclusions in 
that . . . Opinion and Order final.”  App. 4.  Second, the Court 
determined that in assessing “the position of the United 
States,” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A app., it would consider not only 
“the litigation position of the [Department of Justice (DOJ)] 
through th[e] . . . U.S. Attorney’s Office” but also “the actions 
taken (or not taken) by the federal agency upon which the crim-
inal case is based”—that is, DHS, including “the actions of 
DHS Officers in 2011.”  App. 26–27.  Third, borrowing a 
phrase used in the indictment, the Court deemed the deficien-
cies in Reyes-Romero’s immigration forms so apparent that it 
was “frivolous” for the Government to prosecute him on the 
ground that he “had been previously . . . removed from the 
United States pursuant to law.”  App. 31 (citation omitted).  
Fourth, although the Court acknowledged that the Govern-
ment’s arguments on § 1326(d)(3)’s prejudice requirement 
“did not brush up against any prosecutorial misconduct” and 
“were largely reasonable and based in law,” it reasoned that 
“this ‘good’ . . . [does not] sufficiently outweigh[] the ‘bad.’” 
App. 42.  Finally, the Court found that the Government’s be-
havior “before and during the criminal prosecution . . . demon-
strated conscious wrongdoing,” making the prosecution one 
brought “in bad faith” under the Amendment.  App. 28.  So the 
Court ordered the Government to pay Reyes-Romero’s costs 
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and attorney’s fees, which it later calculated as $73,757.00.  
This appeal followed. 
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, 
and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Despite a 
circuit conflict over whether an appeal from a Hyde Amend-
ment application is civil or criminal for purposes of Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, compare, e.g., United States v. 
Truesdale, 211 F.3d 898, 902–04 (5th Cir. 2000) (civil), with, 
e.g., United States v. Robbins, 179 F.3d 1268, 1269–70 (10th 
Cir. 1999) (criminal), we are assured of our jurisdiction and 
need not decide the issue because Reyes-Romero’s notice of 
appeal was timely filed even under Rule 4(b)’s shorter dead-
line.  See United States v. True, 250 F.3d 410, 421 n.8 (6th Cir. 
2001) (taking this approach). 
We review a Hyde Amendment award for abuse of discre-
tion, United States v. Manzo, 712 F.3d 805, 809–10 (3d Cir. 
2013), “which occurs if the district court’s decision rests upon 
a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of 
law[,] or an improper application of law to fact,” Ferreras v. 
Am. Airlines, Inc., 946 F.3d 178, 182 n.1 (3d Cir. 2019) (cita-
tion omitted). 
III.  DISCUSSION 
A defendant seeking fees and costs under the Hyde Amend-
ment bears the burden, United States v. Manzo, 712 F.3d 805, 
810 (3d Cir. 2013), of showing that the “position of the United 
States was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith,” Pub. L. 
No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997) (codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 3006A app.).  Those grounds for a cost- and fee-
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shifting award were “curtailed significantly” from those in the 
more permissive Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) provision 
on which the Hyde Amendment was generally modeled.  
United States v. Gilbert, 198 F.3d 1293, 1302–03 (11th Cir. 
1999).  As a result, a criminal defendant seeking costs and fees 
under the Hyde Amendment faces a “daunting obstacle.”  
Manzo, 712 F.3d at 810 (quoting United States v. Isaiah, 
434 F.3d 513, 519 (6th Cir. 2006)). 
That obstacle is insurmountable here.  Although Reyes-
Romero attempts to limit our review, contending that the Dis-
trict Court’s previous fact-finding is preclusive and that the 
Government has waived several of its arguments, we conclude 
those attempts are futile.  And once we assess the complete 
record, we perceive no basis for a Hyde Amendment award.  
From the inception of the prosecution and throughout the ex-
tensive briefing and hearings, the Government had objectively 
reasonable arguments that Reyes-Romero was not prejudiced 
by errors in his 2011 removal proceeding and thus could not 
prevail on his § 1326(d) challenge.  The Government’s posi-
tion, therefore, was not frivolous—a high bar requiring that the 
prosecution be “utterly without foundation in law or fact.”  
United States v. Monson, 636 F.3d 435, 440 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(citation omitted).  Nor was the prosecution brought or main-
tained in bad faith—an equally high bar requiring an objective 
showing of “dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.”  Manzo, 
712 F.3d at 811 (quoting Gilbert, 198 F.3d at 1299).  Below, 
we address issue preclusion and waiver before turning to the 
merits of the Hyde Amendment application. 
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A. Threshold Issues 
Reyes-Romero does not defend the District Court’s deci-
sion directly.  Instead, he advances two arguments that, if ac-
cepted, would restrict our review of the bases for that decision.  
Neither is persuasive. 
1. Issue preclusion 
Reyes-Romero contends that findings and conclusions in 
the District Court’s opinion resolving the parties’ motions to 
dismiss were rendered “final and binding” by the Govern-
ment’s decision to appeal not those rulings but only the award 
of fees and costs.  Appellee’s Br. 1.  In support, he cites cases 
involving the doctrine of issue preclusion, which holds that “a 
prior judgment . . . foreclose[es] successive litigation of an is-
sue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court 
determination essential to the prior judgment.”  Herrera v. Wy-
oming, 139 S. Ct. 1686, 1697 (2019) (alterations in original) 
(citation omitted).  But issue preclusion does not apply here for 
three independent reasons. 
First, as Reyes-Romero recognizes, issue preclusion ap-
plies only “in a subsequent action.”  Appellee’s Br. 9 (quoting 
1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (Am. Law Inst. 
1982)); see United States ex rel. Doe v. Heart Sol., PC, 
923 F.3d 308, 316 (3d Cir. 2019) (requiring that the issues be 
resolved in an “earlier case” (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 
449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980))); Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. FEMA, 
126 F.3d 461, 474 (3d Cir. 1997) (requiring that they be “de-
cided in a previous action”); see also United States v. Briseno, 
843 F.3d 264, 270 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that issue preclusion 
“applies to rulings in different proceedings, and not simply dif-
ferent stages within the same proceeding”).  “Relitigation of 
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issues previously determined in the same litigation,” on the 
other hand, “is controlled by principles of the law of the case 
doctrine rather than [issue preclusion].”  Hull v. Freeman, 
991 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1993) (emphasis added).   
Reyes-Romero’s criminal prosecution and Hyde Amend-
ment application are, at least for these purposes, part of the 
“same litigation,” Hull, 991 F.2d at 90.  The Amendment au-
thorizes fee-shifting “in . . . criminal case[s],” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3006A app. (emphasis added), and an application must be 
submitted “within thirty days of final judgment,” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2412(d)(1)(B); see 18 U.S.C. § 3006A app.  Although the is-
sues involved in deciding a defendant’s guilt or innocence and 
those involved in a Hyde Amendment application are not iden-
tical, the latter flow directly from the former.  An application 
for attorney’s fees and costs under the Amendment, therefore, 
is merely a “different stage[] within the same proceeding,” 
Briseno, 843 F.3d at 270 (emphasis omitted).  So under Hull, 
if the District Court’s previous findings are to have binding ef-
fect, that effect must flow not from issue preclusion, but from 
the law-of-the-case doctrine. 
That doctrine, however, is of no help to Reyes-Romero be-
cause “[a]n appellate court’s function is to revisit matters de-
cided in the trial court.”  Musacchio v. United States, 136 S. 
Ct. 709, 716 (2016).  As a result, we are “not bound by district 
court rulings under the law-of-the-case doctrine,” id.; see Kop-
pers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 158 F.3d 170, 173 n.4 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (“[T]he district court’s reference to ‘law of the case’ 
cannot bind this Court on appeal.”), and we owe no defer-
ence—beyond what the clear error standard of review de-
mands—to findings in the District Court’s previous opinion. 
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Second, issue preclusion “cannot apply when the party 
against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate that issue.”  Heart Sol., 923 F.3d 
at 316 (quoting Allen, 449 U.S. at 95).  Without an “incentive 
to obtain a full and fair adjudication” of an issue, a party will 
not be bound by the court’s resolution of it.  1 Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments § 28(5).   
Here, however, the Government had no incentive to contest 
the District Court’s findings or appeal its gratuitous denial of 
the Government’s motion to dismiss.  By the time the District 
Court resolved the parties’ motions to dismiss, the Government 
had long disclaimed reliance on the DHS officers’ testimony 
and abandoned any argument on § 1326(d)’s exhaustion or ju-
dicial-review prongs.  And given that the Government had 
agreed the prosecution should be dismissed, it comes as no sur-
prise that it chose not to appeal the Court’s order of dismissal.  
We cannot impute to the Government an “incentive to . . . ad-
judicat[e],” 1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(5), fac-
tual findings made en route to a disposition it sought.  Nor 
would it be prudent to do so, as a contrary rule “would force 
the [Government] to abandon . . . prudential concerns and to 
appeal every adverse decision in order to avoid foreclosing fur-
ther review,” United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 161 
(1984), of any issues that might bear on a Hyde Amendment 
application. 
Third, issue preclusion applies only where the issue in 
question was “essential to the prior judgment.”  Nat’l R.R. Pas-
senger Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 342 F.3d 242, 252 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).  That limitation “is rooted in prin-
ciples of fairness” and “ensures that preclusive effect is not 
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given to determinations that did not receive close judicial at-
tention . . . or that were unappealable by virtue of being inci-
dental to a decision.”  Jean Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. 
L’Oreal USA, Inc., 458 F.3d 244, 250 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  In defining whether an 
issue was “essential,” we ask whether it “was critical to the 
judgment or merely dicta.”  O’Leary v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
923 F.2d 1062, 1067 (3d Cir. 1991). 
The findings on which Reyes-Romero relies were not “crit-
ical to the judgment,” O’Leary, 923 F.3d at 1067, and thus are 
not entitled to preclusive effect.  The dispositive parts of the 
District Court’s opinion were its determinations that Reyes-
Romero had satisfied each of the prongs of § 1326(d), which 
together entitled him to dismissal of the indictment.  But none 
of those prongs demanded an assessment of prosecutorial mo-
tives:  Section 1326(d) focuses on exhaustion, judicial review, 
and fundamental unfairness in relation to underlying removal 
proceedings, and the Government’s motivation in bringing or 
maintaining a prosecution years later has no bearing on those 
issues.8  Nor does the District Court’s decision to address and 
 
8 Nor do the findings related to the immigration officers’ 
misconduct in 2011 have preclusive effect because they con-
tributed to the District Court’s determination that Reyes-
Romero had satisfied § 1326(d)’s exhaustion and judicial-re-
view requirements.  That is because, even beyond what we 
have already explained, issue preclusion applies only where the 
issue is “the same as that involved in the prior action.”  
Karns v. Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 514 n.3 (3d Cir. 2018) (ci-
tation omitted).  Here, however, there is a “lack of total iden-
tity,” 1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. c, 
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deny the Government’s motion to dismiss give rise to preclu-
sion.  Indeed, once the Court granted Reyes-Romero’s 
§ 1326(d) motion on the merits, the Government’s own motion 
to dismiss became moot—a dynamic the District Court recog-
nized with respect to the issue of release on bond—so the 
Court’s ruling on that motion and attendant findings were, in 
any event, beyond its jurisdiction.9 
 
between a finding of misconduct as related to the § 1326(d) 
affirmative defense and a finding of misconduct as it bears on 
whether the government’s litigation position was in bad faith 
under the Hyde Amendment. 
9 We briefly address and reject two additional arguments.  
First, we have held “that independently sufficient alternative 
findings should be given preclusive effect” even where those 
findings “do not fulfill the necessity requirement . . . in a strict 
sense.”  Jean Alexander Cosmetics, 458 F.3d at 255.  But com-
ments made in the course of denying the Government’s motion 
to dismiss cannot be viewed as alternative bases for the result 
here, which was a dismissal of the indictment.  Second, alt-
hough we have recognized that district courts have an “inde-
pendent responsibilit[y]” to examine whether a Rule 48 motion 
to dismiss is “clearly contrary to manifest public interest,” 
App. 1030–31 (quoting In re Richards, 213 F.3d 773, 787–88 
(3d Cir. 2000)), we have never suggested that responsibility 
extends where the court has already granted a defendant’s sep-
arate motion to dismiss on the merits, leaving it with no live 
controversy with respect to the government’s motion.   
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For these reasons, we reject Reyes-Romero’s argument that 
we are bound by findings or conclusions in the District Court’s 
previous order.   
2. Waiver 
Of course, even if our review is not limited by issue preclu-
sion or the law of the case, it “may well be constrained by other 
doctrines such as waiver [or] forfeiture.”  Musacchio, 136 S. 
Ct. at 716.  Reyes-Romero seizes on those doctrines, arguing 
that the Government waived several arguments it advances on 
appeal by not pressing them before the District Court at the 
Hyde Amendment stage.  We disagree. 
Reyes-Romero identifies only two arguments he contends 
are waived: (i) that the delayed production of color copies of 
Reyes-Romero’s immigration forms was a “snafu” attributable 
to Reyes-Romero’s counsel’s failure “to inspect the originals,” 
Appellant’s Br. 48; and (ii) that the District Court’s finding that 
Officer Darji had lied under oath hinged on a “misread[ing]” 
of his testimony,10 id. at 45.  Reyes-Romero is correct in a lim-
ited sense:  Those arguments do not appear in the Govern-
ment’s response to his Hyde Amendment application.  And at 
least as a general matter, “[a]rguments not raised in the district 
courts are waived on appeal,” United States v. Tyler, 956 F.3d 
116, 124 n.9 (3d Cir. 2020), such that we cannot consider them 
 
10 Although Reyes-Romero’s brief identifies a third argu-
ment—that Reyes-Romero “wanted to drop his claim for asy-
lum,” Appellee’s Br. 13 (citing Appellant’s Br. 53)—a review 
of the Government’s brief reveals no such argument. 
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“absent exceptional circumstances,” United States v. James, 
955 F.3d 336, 345 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). 
But our case law does not require parties to relitigate previ-
ously decided issues before the district court where doing so 
“would be an exercise in wasteful formality.”  United States v. 
Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 165 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); 
see Chassen v. Fidelity Nat’l Fin., Inc., 836 F.3d 291, 293 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (“[A] litigant [need not] engage in futile gestures 
merely to avoid a claim of waiver.” (second alteration in orig-
inal) (citation omitted)).  Here, by the time the District Court 
had ruled on the parties’ motions to dismiss and Reyes-Romero 
had applied for costs and fees, the Court’s views on the prose-
cutor’s conduct and the DHS officers’ candor were beyond 
doubt, and relitigating them would have been nothing more 
than a “futile gesture[],” Chassen, 836 F.3d at 293.  Faced with 
a court “more convinced than ever” on those points, App. 792, 
the Government’s choice not to relitigate them was therefore 
reasonable and did not constitute waiver or forfeiture. 
B. Merits of the Hyde Amendment Application 
Having dispensed with those threshold issues, we now turn 
to the merits of the Hyde Amendment award.  For the reasons 
we explain below, we conclude that AUSA Hallowell, acting 
on behalf of the Government, satisfied the high ethical and pro-
fessional standards to which we hold prosecutors, and the Dis-
trict Court mistakenly extrapolated from errors on the part of 
DHS to make findings about the prosecution that the record 
cannot support. 
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We start with two clarifications about the applicable legal 
framework and then explain why the Government’s position 
was neither frivolous nor in bad faith.11 
1. The applicable legal framework 
The Hyde Amendment applies where, “in a[] criminal 
case[,] . . . the position of the United States was vexatious, friv-
olous, or in bad faith.”  18 U.S.C. § 3006A app.  The District 
Court examined a wealth of case law on the Amendment and 
accurately summarized much of the applicable legal frame-
work.  But we must clarify two aspects of that framework at 
the outset, one concerning “the position of the United States” 
and the other the requirement that that position be “vexatious, 
frivolous, or in bad faith.” 
 
11 Although Reyes-Romero argued in the District Court that 
the Government’s position was also vexatious, the Court found 
only frivolousness and bad faith, and Reyes-Romero has not 
specifically argued vexatiousness on appeal.  To the extent that 
argument is implicit in his others, however, we reject it on the 
same grounds.  Vexatiousness embodies two elements: (i) “that 
the criminal case was objectively deficient, in that it lacked ei-
ther legal merit or factual foundation”; and (ii) “that the gov-
ernment’s conduct, when viewed objectively, manifests mali-
ciousness or an intent to harass or annoy.”  Manzo, 712 F.3d at 
810 (citation omitted).  The former roughly corresponds to 
frivolousness and the latter to bad faith, so our analysis here 
essentially covers all three grounds for a Hyde Amendment 
award. 
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i. The meaning of “position of the United 
States” 
Notwithstanding its reference to “the position of the United 
States,” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A app., the Hyde Amendment is not 
a tool to combat misconduct by the federal government writ 
large.  It applies only “in a[] criminal case,” id., which directs 
us to focus on “the government’s position underlying the pros-
ecution,” Manzo, 712 F.3d at 810 (emphasis added) (quoting 
Gilbert, 198 F.3d at 1299).  The Amendment thus reaches 
“prosecutorial misconduct” affecting the “case as an inclusive 
whole,” id. (citations omitted), not misconduct in distinct gov-
ernment proceedings nor isolated “errors” by individual law 
enforcement officers in the course of the investigation or pros-
ecution, id. at 813.   
Our sister circuits share that view.  The Second Circuit, for 
instance, reads “the position of the United States” for Hyde 
Amendment purposes “to mean . . . the government’s general 
litigation stance: its reasons for bringing a prosecution, its 
characterization of the facts, and its legal arguments.”  United 
States v. Bove, 888 F.3d 606, 608 (2d Cir. 2018).  The Ninth 
Circuit reads the Amendment as requiring an assessment of 
“the government’s litigating position as a whole,” not of “other 
types of bad conduct by government employees during the 
course of an investigation.”  United States v. Mixon, 930 F.3d 
1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 2019); see id. at 1112 (requiring “serious 
misconduct on the part of prosecutors” (emphasis added)).  
Several others have agreed, see, e.g., Monson, 636 F.3d at 439–
40 (holding that a ruling for the defendant under Franks v. Del-
aware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), which “constitutes a finding that 
law enforcement deliberately lied or recklessly disregarded the 
truth,” “does not necessarily mean that . . . the prosecution 
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against the defendant was frivolous or vexatious”), and we are 
aware of no precedential appellate decision taking a different 
approach. 
In sum:  The Hyde Amendment demands we “[f]ocus[] on 
the prosecutors’ conduct,” Monson, 636 F.3d at 439 (emphasis 
added), and ask whether the alleged prosecutorial misconduct 
was so “pervasive” as to “render the government’s litigating 
position as a whole vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith,” 
Mixon, 930 F.3d at 1112 (emphasis added).   
The District Court, however, understood the “position of 
the United States,” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A app., to include both 
“the litigation position of the DOJ through th[e] . . . U.S. At-
torney’s Office and the actions taken (or not taken) by” DHS 
officers, App. 26 (emphasis added), including as far back as 
Reyes-Romero’s administrative removal proceeding in 2011.  
In assessing Reyes-Romero’s Hyde Amendment application, 
for example, the Court found that DHS officers “railroaded 
[him] out of the country in 2011” in a manner that was “lacking 
in any reasonable factual or legal basis” and was therefore friv-
olous, App. 28–29, and that the officers’ testimony in 2018 
“demonstrate[d] clear bad faith” on their part, App. 29. 
That understanding was mistaken.  It assumes that, because 
the EAJA’s “procedures and limitations” are incorporated into 
the Hyde Amendment, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A app., and because 
the EAJA defines “position of the United States” to include, 
“in addition to the position taken by the United States in the 
civil action, the action or failure to act by the agency upon 
which the civil action is based,” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D), the 
Hyde Amendment must also incorporate that definition.  But 
the EAJA’s substantive definition of “position of the United 
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States” is neither a “procedure[]” nor a “limitation[],” so it can-
not be read into the Hyde Amendment.   
And there are good reasons not to compare EAJA apples to 
Hyde Amendment oranges.  For one thing, we took a contrary 
view in Manzo, emphasizing “the government’s position un-
derlying the prosecution” and asking whether it was “objec-
tively []reasonable for the government to attempt to prosecute” 
the defendant.  712 F.3d at 810, 813 (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted); see also, e.g., Mixon, 930 F.3d at 1111 (defining “po-
sition of the United States” under the Hyde Amendment with-
out reference to the EAJA definition); Bove, 888 F.3d at 608 & 
n.10 (noting that the phrase “position of the United States” 
“cannot mean precisely the same thing in both” the Hyde 
Amendment and the EAJA).  For another, the EAJA covers a 
much broader swath of litigation, including civil actions arising 
from agency enforcement or adjudication.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2412(a)(1); see also Taylor v. Heckler, 835 F.2d 1037, 1040 
(3d Cir. 1987) (under the EAJA, the “position of the United 
States” necessarily includes “not only the litigation posi-
tion . . . but also the agency position [that] made the lawsuit 
necessary” (alterations in original) (citation omitted)).  Yet a 
criminal prosecution for unlawful reentry does not fit that par-
adigm:  Although a previous removal order is “a necessary el-
ement to the [§ 1326] charge,” App. 27, the criminal prosecu-
tion is distinct from and collateral to the immigration proceed-
ing that led to the order and thus unlike agency enforcement 
actions that directly lead to civil actions in federal court.  For 
these reasons,12 we reaffirm the principles set out in Manzo and 
 
12 In interpreting the “position of the United States” to in-
clude actions of DHS and its officers, the District Court also 
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cited two out-of-circuit district court opinions—United States v. 
Holland, 34 F. Supp. 2d 346 (E.D. Va. 1999), and United 
States v. Gardner, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (N.D. Okla. 1998)—
both of which were decided before we or many of our sister 
circuits had a chance to construe the Amendment.  In Holland, 
the court considered the defendants’ application for costs and 
fees to flow not from the Hyde Amendment as bounded by the 
“procedures and limitations” of § 2412(d), but from a distinct 
open-ended EAJA provision holding the United States “liable 
for such fees and expenses to the same extent that any other 
party would be liable under the common law,” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2412(b).  See 34 F. Supp. 2d at 356–59.  As the District Court 
recognized elsewhere in its opinion, Holland’s analysis devi-
ates from the “consensus among circuits that the Hyde Amend-
ment incorporates only those procedures and limitations in 
subpart (d).”  App. 25.  And although the Holland court origi-
nally found “vexatious misconduct” on the part of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as well as DOJ, it later 
vacated that portion of its award after concluding the FDIC had 
lacked “sufficient notice that . . . fees and litigation expenses 
might be assessed against it.”  United States v. Holland, 48 F. 
Supp. 2d 571, 581 (E.D. Va. 1999).  In Gardner, the district 
court ruled that the EAJA’s broad definition of “position of the 
United States” is a “procedure or limitation incorporated into 
the Hyde Amendment” and therefore that executive agencies 
like the Internal Revenue Service can be swept into that defi-
nition.  23 F. Supp. 2d at 1293–95.  But that analysis was not 
based on a rigorous analysis of the Amendment’s statutory 
text, has never been cited favorably by any court of appeals, 
and is contrary to both Manzo and our conclusion today.   
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hold that the “position of the United States” for purposes of the 
Hyde Amendment refers only to the position taken by the de-
partment and officers charged with administering the prosecu-
tion—here, DOJ and AUSA Hallowell. 
To be clear, misconduct by law enforcement officers or 
other executive departments can be relevant to a Hyde Amend-
ment application if prosecutors leverage that misconduct to 
further a prosecution that has no factual or legal basis or that is 
brought for purposes of harassment.  But because the Amend-
ment is concerned only with prosecutorial misconduct, see 
Mixon, 930 F.3d at 1112 (“A defendant is not entitled to attor-
neys’ fees under the Hyde Amendment due to law enforcement 
misconduct; rather, the focus is on the prosecutors . . . .”), al-
leged misconduct by DHS or its officers cannot independently 
create liability for attorney’s fees and costs.   
ii. The meaning of “vexatious, frivolous, or in 
bad faith” 
The Hyde Amendment applies where the Government’s lit-
igation position “was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith.”  
18 U.S.C. § 3006A app. (emphasis added).  We have taken the 
Amendment’s use of the disjunctive “or” to mean that each 
ground must be assessed separately, see Manzo, 712 F.3d at 
810–11 (laying out different standards for each), and several of 
our sister circuits agree, see, e.g., Monson, 636 F.3d at 438–39; 
United States v. Manchester Farming P’ship, 315 F.3d 1176, 
1182 (9th Cir. 2003).  While the three grounds meaningfully 
“overlap,” United States v. Terzakis, 854 F.3d 951, 955, 956 
n.3 (7th Cir. 2017), analyzing each on its own helps courts fo-
cus only on relevant factors and not on a nebulous sense of 
government impropriety. 
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When we conduct that analysis on this record and consider 
the Hyde Amendment case law on frivolousness and bad faith, 
we conclude Reyes-Romero is not entitled to an award. 
2. The position of the United States was not  
frivolous 
We and our sister circuits have laid extensive groundwork 
for analyzing frivolousness under the Hyde Amendment.  For 
the Government’s position to be frivolous, the prosecution it 
pursues must be “groundless[,] with little prospect of success.”  
Manzo, 712 F.3d at 810 (alteration in original) (quoting Gil-
bert, 198 F.3d at 1299).  Said differently, the position must be 
“foreclosed by binding precedent or . . . obviously wrong,” id. 
at 811 (quoting United States v. Capener, 608 F.3d 392, 401 
(9th Cir. 2010)), and a prosecution based on an unresolved but 
reasonable legal argument cannot be frivolous, id.  See Bove, 
888 F.3d at 608 (frivolousness requires a prosecution that is 
“[m]anifestly insufficient or futile” (alteration in original) (ci-
tation omitted)); Monson, 636 F.3d at 440 (to be frivolous, a 
prosecution must be “utterly without foundation in law or fact” 
(citation omitted)).  In assessing frivolousness, therefore, we 
view the prosecution through the lens of the elements of the 
criminal charge and the evidence required to satisfy those ele-
ments. 
We also find guidance in Hyde Amendment case law ad-
dressing vexatiousness, which—though a distinct ground for 
awarding fees, see supra note 11—overlaps with frivolousness 
to the extent it too requires that the prosecution be “objectively 
deficient, [meaning] lack[ing] [in] either legal merit or factual 
foundation.”  Manzo, 712 F.3d at 810.  In Manzo, for instance, 
the defendant argued the government had made “blatantly 
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false” allegations about his receipt of a cash bribe.  Id. at 812.  
In that decision, we assumed he had not received the cash and 
that the government had knowingly presented false testimony.  
See id.  Even so, we explained, the charges against the defend-
ant “did not require the government to prove that he physically 
received a cash bribe,” and because the government could 
“plausibly argue that Manzo was aware of the cash pay-
ment . . . and played a role in facilitating it,” it maintained a 
viable—and thus objectively nonfrivolous—pathway to con-
viction.  See id.   
Manzo controls here. Reyes-Romero did not contest either 
element required for conviction under § 1326(a)—that he was 
removed and later found in the country without the Attorney 
General’s consent.  Rather, he sought to attack the removal or-
der collaterally under § 1326(d), which we have treated as akin 
to an affirmative defense.  See Richardson v. United States, 
558 F.3d 216, 222 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Charleswell, 
456 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2006).  Yet at every point in the 
prosecution, from the return of the indictment through the de-
cision resolving the parties’ motions to dismiss, the Govern-
ment had—at minimum—a reasonable argument that Reyes-
Romero could not show prejudice under § 1326(d)(3) and thus 
could not make out the affirmative defense.  The District Court 
even recognized as much, characterizing the Government’s po-
sition on prejudice as “largely reasonable and based in law.”  
App. 42.  
We agree with the characterization of the Government’s 
prejudice arguments as reasonable and based in law, and we 
briefly highlight some of the complexities on which those ar-
guments turned.  The first was whether Reyes-Romero’s 
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conviction qualified as a “crime of violence,” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(F) (incorporating 18 U.S.C. § 16’s definition), 
and thus an aggravated felony rendering him ineligible for asy-
lum, id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(i), and cancellation of re-
moval, id. § 1229b(a)(3).  Although § 16(b)’s residual clause 
has been held void for vagueness, Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. 
Ct. 1204, 1210 (2018); Baptiste v. Att’y Gen., 841 F.3d 601, 
615–21 (3d Cir. 2016), those decisions were not in place in 
2011, and the Government argued prejudice must be assessed 
as of the underlying removal proceedings rather than as of the 
collateral challenge to those proceedings.  Even setting § 16(b) 
aside, Reyes-Romero would remain ineligible for asylum and 
cancellation if his offense fit within § 16(a)’s elements clause, 
which in turn depended on whether an offense capable of com-
mission through reckless conduct can satisfy that clause—a 
difficult and open question the Supreme Court recently agreed 
to resolve, see supra note 3.  A related question was whether 
Reyes-Romero’s offense qualified as a “particularly serious 
crime” rendering him ineligible for withholding of removal, 
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).  At the time of his removal, our 
precedent held “that an offense must be an aggravated felony 
in order to be classified as a ‘particularly serious crime.’”  
Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 105 (3d Cir. 2006).  But we 
have since revisited Alaka, holding that “the phrase ‘particu-
larly serious crime’ . . . includes but is not limited to aggravated 
felonies.”  Bastardo-Vale v. Att’y Gen., 934 F.3d 255, 266–67 
(3d Cir. 2019) (en banc).  And the notion that second-degree 
aggravated assault under New Jersey law could have qualified 
as particularly serious was not out of the question.  See, e.g., 
Aguilar v. Att’y Gen., 665 F. App’x 184, 185–86, 188–89 (3d 
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Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (upholding the BIA’s designation of 
that offense as particularly serious).13   
We need not review every step in the District Court’s anal-
ysis.  It is enough to say we agree that whatever the merits of 
Reyes-Romero’s arguments on prejudice, the Government’s 
arguments in response were “reasonable and based in law,” 
App. 42—or, put another way, were far from “foreclosed by 
binding precedent or . . . obviously wrong,” Manzo, 712 F.3d 
at 811 (citation omitted).  As a result, the Government at all 
times maintained a viable path to conviction, making its litiga-
tion position nonfrivolous under the Hyde Amendment. 
Reyes-Romero argues to the contrary, urging us to accept 
the District Court’s reasoning.  We address each argument be-
low. 
 
13 There is also the matter of Reyes-Romero’s evidence 
showing fear of persecution or torture if returned to El Salva-
dor.  The District Court concluded Reyes-Romero had shown 
a reasonable likelihood of obtaining relief from removal, but it 
did so only after an extensive review of the evidence and the 
case law, and only after reaching favorable conclusions on 
close issues such as the cognizability of Reyes-Romero’s fam-
ily unit as a particular social group, the relevance of incidents 
that took place in Honduras, and whether the private violence 
he feared would qualify as torture for CAT protection.  That 
both the IJ and BIA in Reyes-Romero’s subsequent removal 
proceeding rejected his applications for relief from removal, 
see supra note 6, further suggests the Government’s arguments 
were not beyond the pale. 
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We start with language from Reyes-Romero’s indictment 
stating that he had been “removed from the United States pur-
suant to law.”  App. 31 (quoting App. 63).  Reyes-Romero 
seizes on that language, arguing that if a removal proceeding 
violated DHS’s rules or a noncitizen’s rights, the noncitizen 
was not removed “pursuant to law” and thus cannot be prose-
cuted for unlawful reentry regardless whether he can show that 
those errors caused him prejudice.  But that argument runs 
aground on our precedent, which holds that “prejudice is a nec-
essary component under [§] 1326(d)(3).”  Charleswell, 
456 F.3d at 358.  In plain terms, a criminal defendant who con-
cedes the elements of § 1326(a) but cannot satisfy 
§ 1326(d)(3)’s prejudice requirement—which, we have held, 
generally requires a showing of “a reasonable likelihood that 
the result would have been different if the error in the [re-
moval] proceeding had not occurred,” id. at 362 (citation omit-
ted)—is guilty of unlawful reentry, and the Government’s 
prosecution of that charge cannot be “groundless,” Manzo, 
712 F.3d at 810 (citation omitted). 
 Reyes-Romero’s argument to the contrary is essentially 
that when a defendant has a good case on some but not all the 
elements of an affirmative defense, the Government must con-
cede the rest and consent to dismissal on his terms.  That 
simply is not the law.  Although our criminal justice system 
depends on prosecutors’ discretion to decide which cases to 
pursue, their choice to pursue an objectively valid prosecution 
is immune from scrutiny by the federal courts.  Put another 
way, our “constitutional framework” is such that “we cannot 
read the Hyde Amendment to license judicial second-guessing 
of prosecutions that are objectively reasonable,” United 
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States v. Shaygan, 652 F.3d 1297, 1314 (11th Cir. 2011)—as 
this prosecution undoubtedly was. 
Nor was the Government bound to abandon the prosecution 
because it shined a light on an administrative removal proceed-
ing that, as the Government acknowledges, was something of 
a “botched job.”  Arg. Tr. 15.  To the contrary, “[i]t is the re-
sponsibility of the Department of Justice to enforce the law 
vigorously[,] and it cannot abdicate this duty because of possi-
ble embarrassment to other agencies of the government.”  U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Justice Manual § 9-2.159 (2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/jm/justice-manual.  Despite signs that 
DHS might have mishandled Reyes-Romero’s administrative 
removal, AUSA Hallowell nonetheless maintained a nonfrivo-
lous pathway to conviction throughout the prosecution, and un-
der those circumstances we cannot fault him or the office he 
represents for continuing to seek such a conviction. 
As a last resort, Reyes-Romero suggests we deem the pros-
ecution frivolous because prejudice must be “presume[d].”  
Arg. Tr. 31–32.  He relies for this proposition on Charleswell, 
where we stated that “some procedural defects may be so cen-
tral or core to a proceeding’s legitimacy, . . . and the difficulty 
of proving prejudice so great[,] that prejudice may be pre-
sumed.”  456 F.3d at 362 n.17 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).   
That language, however, is dicta in a footnote.  We have 
never given effect to the possibility we left open in 
Charleswell, nor (to our knowledge) has any other court of ap-
peals.  Nor need we address that possibility today; the point, 
rather, is that where no appellate court has so held to date, we 
cannot say the Government lacked a “reasonable legal basis” 
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for contending § 1326(d)(3)’s prejudice prong could not be sat-
isfied.  Manzo, 712 F.3d at 811 (citation omitted); see id. (“The 
government should be allowed to base a prosecution on a novel 
argument, so long as it is a reasonable one, without fear that it 
might be setting itself up for liability under the Hyde Amend-
ment.” (citation omitted)).  It would also be especially perverse 
to fault the Government for ignoring this possibility here given 
that Reyes-Romero—who carries the burden on each of 
§ 1326(d)’s elements—failed to mention it until his supple-
mental reply brief filed months after his initial § 1326(d) mo-
tion.   
In sum, the Government at all times had a legally defensible 
and factually supported basis for prosecuting Reyes-Romero 
for unlawful reentry.  The “position of the United States,” 
18 U.S.C. § 3006A app., therefore, was not frivolous.14 
 
14 In analyzing a Hyde Amendment application, the district 
court’s task is to “make only one finding . . . based on the case 
as an inclusive whole” rather than engaging in “[a] count-by-
count analysis.”  Manzo, 712 F.3d at 810 (citation omitted).  
Here, that task is straightforward because Reyes-Romero was 
charged with only one offense.  We therefore have no occasion 
to address the implications of a multicount prosecution where 
only one or some counts are viable.  Cf. United States v. Heav-
rin, 330 F.3d 723, 730 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that a Hyde 
Amendment award may be appropriate “[e]ven if the district 
court determines that part of the government’s case has merit” 
so long as “the government’s ‘position’ as a whole was vexa-
tious, frivolous, or in bad faith”). 
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3. The position of the United States was not in  
bad faith 
Nor did the Government initiate or prolong Reyes-
Romero’s criminal prosecution in bad faith.   
On this issue, too, we benefit from a well-developed line of 
precedent.  Bad faith requires more than “bad judgment or neg-
ligence”; it demands “the conscious doing of a wrong because 
of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.”  Manzo, 712 F.3d at 
811.  And in assessing whether the “position of the United 
States was . . . in bad faith,” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A app., we may 
not “delve into the minds and motivations of individual prose-
cutors,” Manzo, 712 F.3d at 813.  Instead, we must “engage in 
an objective inquiry,” Manzo, 712 F.3d at 811 (citing Shaygan, 
652 F.3d at 1313–14), asking whether “[u]nder th[e] circum-
stances” the government’s litigation strategy was “objectively 
unreasonable” in light of the facts and “binding case law.”  Id. 
at 813.  And in doing so, we must be wary to leave prosecutors 
the breathing space necessary to pursue justice with vigor.  A 
Hyde Amendment award is not available simply because a de-
fendant was acquitted or because the government engaged in 
“contentious and hard-fought” litigation tactics.  United 
States v. Schneider, 395 F.3d 78, 88 (2d Cir. 2005).  To the 
contrary, “government attorneys are entitled to be zealous ad-
vocates of the law on behalf of the . . . people of the United 
States,” and “[w]hile a prosecutor is not at liberty to strike foul 
blows, he may strike hard ones . . . —indeed, he should.”  
United States v. Knott, 256 F.3d 20, 29 (1st Cir. 2001) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).   
The District Court identified seven points throughout the 
prosecution that in its view constituted “evidence of bad faith,” 
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App. 36, on the part of AUSA Hallowell and, by extension, 
DOJ.  We address them one by one.  Although we generally 
owe deference to factual findings, any finding that “is implau-
sible based on the record” is clearly erroneous and thus “un-
sustainable.”  Capener, 608 F.3d at 403; see United States v. 
Heavrin, 330 F.3d 723, 727 (6th Cir. 2003) (reversal of a Hyde 
Amendment award is required where the reviewing court is left 
with “a definite and firm conviction” that “a mistake has been 
made” (citation omitted)).   
i. Obtaining the indictment 
First, we disagree that the Government relied on “facially 
invalid waivers,” App. 31, to seek an indictment and proceed 
with the prosecution against Reyes-Romero.  Even if we were 
to accept that the Government was “mistaken at the time of 
[the] [i]ndictment,” App. 31, “the Hyde Amendment [is] tar-
geted at prosecutorial misconduct, not prosecutorial mistake,” 
Capener, 608 F.3d at 401 (alteration in original) (citation omit-
ted).  And here, the contents of Reyes-Romero’s A-file gave 
the Government probable cause to believe that he fell within 
the facial elements of the § 1326(a) offense.  Although a de-
fendant in Reyes-Romero’s position may bring a collateral 
challenge under § 1326(d), that challenge is akin to an affirm-
ative defense, and it is up to the defendant to assert and prove 
it.  That defense does not turn on whether the removal was 
“pursuant to law,” App. 31; it requires (among other things) 
prejudice, Charleswell, 456 F.3d at 358, and there was nothing 
in the A-file to suggest Reyes-Romero could show a reasonable 
likelihood of any outcome other than removal.  When viewed 
objectively, therefore, the decision to indict and prosecute 
Reyes-Romero does not give rise to an inference of bad faith. 
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ii. The DHS officers’ testimony 
Nor are we persuaded that Officers Darji and Alicea gave 
false testimony or that the Government’s refusal to label it as 
such violated its obligations under Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 
264 (1959). 
We start with the most frequently quoted portion of the tes-
timony:  Officer Darji’s acknowledgment that the forms in 
Reyes-Romero’s A-file did not “make any sense.”  App. 331.  
It is not the case that Officer Darji “admitted on the stand that 
his testimony (given just moments before) was, in fact, non-
sense.”  App. 32 (emphasis added).  Officer Darji had no spe-
cific memory of Reyes-Romero’s proceeding, and thus offered 
testimony only about the “normal practice” in his DHS unit, 
App. 319.  In the leadup to Officer Darji’s oft-quoted admis-
sion, the District Court took over questioning and presented 
him with the irregularities in Reyes-Romero’s forms, asking 
whether it was “reading those forms correctly.”  App. 331.  The 
Court then asked whether “that”—the antecedent of which was 
the content of “those forms”—“ma[de] any sense,” and Darji 
admitted it did not.  Id.   
In context, Officer Darji’s comment was a candid admis-
sion that he could not explain away the apparent problems with 
Reyes-Romero’s removal proceeding.  And, at least initially, 
the District Court agreed, summarizing that Officer Darji had 
admitted that “the process that was used here” did not 
“ma[ke] . . . sense.”  App. 476.  The quite different notion that 
Darji admitted that he had lied in his testimony, however, “is a 
kind of [factual] Lohengrin,” in that we do not “know whence 
it came,” IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 
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1975).  Because that notion finds no support in the record, we 
reject it. 
As a result, nothing in Officer Darji’s concession triggered 
Napue obligations on the part of AUSA Hallowell.  Those ob-
ligations spring to life only when the prosecutor “knows that 
his witness is giving testimony that is substantially misleading” 
and where the misleading nature of the testimony is “obvious.”  
United States v. Harris, 498 F.2d 1164, 1169 (3d Cir. 1974).  
A candid admission of the kind Officer Darji gave does not fit 
those criteria. 
Nor do the remaining portions of the DHS officers’ testi-
mony.  To be sure, both officers, testifying years later and with 
no specific memory of Reyes-Romero’s removal proceeding, 
gave testimony that was at times equivocal, confusing, or in-
consistent.  Officer Darji, for instance, changed an answer he 
gave about whether a prior signature was required to authorize 
service of the I-851 on noncitizens.  For his part, Officer Alicea 
gave difficult-to-reconcile answers in response to questions 
about when in the process the I-851’s contents would be read 
to the noncitizen in Spanish.  But to the extent the officers’ 
testimony was somewhat “convoluted,” App. 43 (citation omit-
ted), it reflects at least in part the byzantine nature of the ad-
ministrative removal system and in part the circumstances of 
their questioning.  Given that the District Court assumed the 
questioning and raised a line of inquiry about the time stamps 
on the I-851 that Reyes-Romero had not flagged and for which 
the Government and its witnesses likely had not prepared, it is 
unsurprising the officers were in some respects ill equipped to 
explain the contents of Reyes-Romero’s A-file.  In short, while 
we recognize certain weaknesses in the officers’ testimony, we 
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discern no basis in the record to conclude that the officers were 
deliberately perjuring themselves.  At most, they exhibited the 
kind of inconsistency that is the normal stuff of cross-exami-
nation and that might lead a trier of fact to discount their testi-
mony—but not to assume the sort of deliberate dishonesty that 
would require a prosecutor to correct the record.  In our judg-
ment, that distinction is critical here not only because of the 
effect on AUSA Hallowell’s obligations but also because of 
the severe reputational, professional, and legal consequences 
that could flow from a finding that Officers Darji and Alicea 
deliberately lied under oath.  That finding was unjustified here. 
At bottom, the Napue argument comes to this: that because 
the District Court ultimately decided not to credit the officers’ 
testimony, the Government must have been obligated to dis-
claim it mid-trial.  That does not follow.  In presenting the tes-
timony of government witnesses, a prosecutor need not “play 
the role of defense counsel . . . and ferret out ambiguities in his 
witness’ responses on cross-examination.”  Harris, 498 F.2d at 
1169.  He also cannot supplant the role of the finder of fact in 
assigning weight to testimony as he deems appropriate.  We 
therefore discern no violation of AUSA Hallowell’s Napue ob-
ligations and no basis here to infer bad faith.   
iii. Litigating exhaustion and judicial review 
We next confront the idea that the Government exhibited 
bad faith by continuing to litigate exhaustion and judicial re-
view even after the extent of the irregularities in Reyes-
Romero’s A-file came to light.  A review of the record reveals 
the opposite: that AUSA Hallowell promptly and appropriately 
abandoned all arguments on § 1326(d)(1) and (2). 
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The initial two-day hearing on Reyes-Romero’s § 1326(d) 
motion took place in early January 2018.  During the second 
day, the District Court informed the parties it was “highly 
likely” to rule in Reyes-Romero’s favor on exhaustion and ju-
dicial review.  App. 474–75.  That left prejudice as “the only 
open issue,” App. 543, on which the District Court requested 
additional briefing.  The parties twice requested more time to 
submit a schedule for that briefing and did not settle on such a 
schedule until late January.  A month later—and before its sup-
plemental brief was due—the Government moved to dismiss 
under Rule 48.  No doubt the Government expected its motion 
would be the end of the case.  But after the District Court con-
tinued to press the Government on the merits of the § 1326(d) 
motion, it promptly filed a brief in mid-March making its po-
sition clear:  It would “not rely on or adopt th[e officers’] tes-
timony” and, if pushed to litigate the § 1326(d) motion, 
“w[ould] not present argument on any elements . . . other than 
the issue of prejudice.”  App. 755.  And it reinforced that posi-
tion at the next hearing.   
AUSA Hallowell’s response was prompt, unambiguous, 
and consistent with the best traditions and standards of his of-
fice.  That it occurred “over two months” after the initial hear-
ing, App. 32, was a product of the parties’ agreed briefing 
schedule, the Court’s unexpected reservations about the Gov-
ernment’s motion to dismiss, and its ongoing inquiry into the 
effect of a dismissal on future immigration proceedings.  The 
Government was still “act[ing] promptly to correct [any] er-
ror,” United States v. Lain, 640 F.3d 1134, 1139 (10th Cir. 
2011), and its response is inconsistent with a finding of bad 
faith.   
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iv. Interactions between DOJ and DHS 
We likewise see no signs of bad faith in AUSA Hallowell’s 
inability to tell the District Court whether, if the prosecution 
were dismissed, DHS would detain Reyes-Romero or seek re-
instatement of the 2011 removal order.  In asserting that he 
could not “speak for DHS . . . or what [it] would do” in future 
immigration proceedings against Reyes-Romero, App. 617, 
AUSA Hallowell was faithfully representing our precedent to 
the District Court.  See United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 
443–44 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that an AUSA cannot bind 
DHS in future immigration proceedings absent DHS’s con-
sent).  Had the Court granted the Government’s motion to dis-
miss, any relevance of the 2011 order would have been left to 
DHS in the first instance (in deciding whether to pursue a new 
NTA or seek reinstatement) and, if necessary, to other admin-
istrative adjudicators and a different Article III court. 
To be sure, it is possible for an AUSA, after having ob-
tained “prior authorization from [DHS],” Justice Manual, su-
pra, § 9-73.510, to come to a binding agreement with respect 
to future immigration proceedings against a noncitizen defend-
ant.  But an AUSA lacks the power to do so on his own.  More 
important, whether and under what circumstances he reaches 
out to DHS to explore such an arrangement is committed to his 
discretion—he is not bound to do so.  And even if he does seek 
authorization from DHS, he cannot demand that the agency 
give it, and if the agency declines the AUSA cannot be held 
responsible.  When viewed through an objective lens, there-
fore, the absence of such an arrangement between DOJ and 
DHS with respect to future proceedings against Reyes-Romero 
also does not support an inference of bad faith. 
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Two related issues must be addressed.  First, we do not con-
sider significant that DHS and DOJ were to some extent “in-
tertwin[ed] . . . in this case,” App. 37 (emphasis omitted), in-
sofar as DOJ and DHS kept in contact about Reyes-Romero or 
a line-level DHS official was present at counsel table for all but 
one of the hearings before the District Court.  Coordination be-
tween DOJ and other executive departments is by no means 
unusual, but it does not obviate the line between those depart-
ments or between a criminal prosecution and subsequent ad-
ministrative proceedings.  We therefore see no support for the 
notion that the Government here attempted to use its collabo-
ration with DHS as both a sword and a shield against Reyes-
Romero. 
Second, we are equally unpersuaded that the AUSA exhib-
ited bad faith by focusing on the criminal offense with which 
Reyes-Romero was charged, the evidence necessary to prove 
that offense, and the elements of Reyes-Romero’s affirmative 
defense.  Those were, after all, the only live issues over which 
the District Court had jurisdiction.  Even so, AUSA Hallowell 
did his best to assist the Court in its consideration of matters 
well beyond that jurisdiction, most notably the effect that var-
ious dispositions might have on future immigration proceed-
ings against Reyes-Romero.  The AUSA’s responsiveness, 
candor, and professionalism in answering unanticipated ques-
tions bespeak good faith on his part and in the “position of the 
United States,” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A app.  And in general, the 
AUSA offered candid and accurate assistance to the tribunal; 
was forthright about the weaknesses in the case; and, once he 
had received additional evidence bolstering Reyes-Romero’s 
arguments on prejudice and once the prosecution had ex-
hausted more time and resources than was expected, sensibly 
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reevaluated it and decided dismissal was in the best interests of 
justice.  There is much to commend in the way the prosecution 
litigated this case, and certainly nothing of the “dishonest pur-
pose or moral obliquity,” Manzo, 712 F.3d at 811 (citation 
omitted), required to justify a Hyde Amendment award. 
v. The Government’s motion to dismiss 
We now come to a central premise of the Hyde Amendment 
award: that the Government’s motion to dismiss was motivated 
by, and evidence of, bad faith. 
There is good reason for skepticism:  It is ironic indeed that 
the government’s decision to move to dismiss a criminal case 
with prejudice would be held up as proof of ill will toward the 
defendant.  Normally, if circumstances arise making it clear 
that the Government’s case is weaker than it once appeared and 
the “Government act[s] promptly to correct [that] error,” a 
court will be hard pressed to find bad faith.  Lain, 640 F.3d at 
1139.  The District Court recognized this dynamic, correctly 
stating that if an AUSA “conclude[s] that a criminal prosecu-
tion should not proceed” and moves to dismiss, that is an ap-
propriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion and precisely 
“how we want the system to work.”  App. 635.  But it pro-
ceeded to find that motion was evidence of bad faith on two 
grounds. 
The first was that the motion was designed “to shield the 
2011 Removal Order from an adjudication of invalidity” and 
thereby interfere with future immigration proceedings against 
Reyes-Romero.  App. 36.  In other words, because the Govern-
ment agreed the prosecution should be dismissed, it had no 
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non-malicious reason for refusing “to not oppose the bare 
granting of Reyes-Romero’s motion to dismiss.”  App. 4. 
Implicit in that analysis is that there is no meaningful dif-
ference between (i) exercising discretion to dismiss the prose-
cution because of some “litigation risk” on the prejudice prong, 
App. 646, and (ii) conceding outright that Reyes-Romero has 
satisfied the prejudice prong.  Not so.  A prosecutor may have 
probable cause to believe an element of an affirmative defense 
is triable but still conclude that, because of the closeness of the 
question as well as other considerations such as expenses and 
the time a defendant has already been in custody, the interests 
of justice would not be well served by continuing to pursue the 
prosecution.  That is, indeed, how the system should work.  
And, most critical, the Government must be free to do so with-
out having to concede away the merits of the criminal charge 
or any affirmative defenses, which would have been the effect 
of endorsing Reyes-Romero’s § 1326(d) motion. 
Nor can we agree that the Government was “[n]ever 
asked . . . to stipulate to ‘prejudice’” and could have opted to 
“‘not oppose’ the granting of Reyes-Romero’s motion.”  
App. 15–16.  Because dismissal under § 1326(d) requires prej-
udice, see 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(3); Charleswell, 456 F.3d at 358, 
the Government cannot agree to a § 1326(d) dismissal without 
acknowledging that the prejudice requirement has been met.  
And given the closeness of the prejudice question, see supra 
pp. 35–37 & n.13, it strikes us as objectively reasonable that 
the Government elected not to do so. 
The second ground for the finding that the Government 
moved to dismiss in bad faith was that the reasons it offered in 
support of its motion were pretextual.  After a review of the 
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record, we conclude the Government’s reasons were sensible 
and consistent.  It explained, for instance, that its motion to 
dismiss was motivated in part by a desire to preserve litigation 
resources.  That is no surprise given that the single-count pros-
ecution had already lasted months and generated many hear-
ings and briefs.  True, the Government “then expended sub-
stantial resources on continuing to oppose Reyes-Romero’s 
motion to dismiss” while its own motion remained pending.  
App. 39.  But that was only because the Government’s motion 
was held open, requiring that it continue to litigate the merits 
of Reyes-Romero’s § 1326(d) defense.  The Government’s ex-
planation can be viewed as contradictory only if we assume 
there was no difference between acceding to Reyes-Romero’s 
motion and proceeding on the Government’s motion—an idea 
we have already rejected.   
vi. Production of the color copies 
Next, we see no evidence to support the idea that the late-
in-the-game production of color copies from Reyes-Romero’s 
A-file suggests bad faith on the Government’s part.  Under the 
line of cases springing from Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963), prosecutors have an affirmative duty to disclose mate-
rial evidence favorable to the defendant.  Dennis v. Sec’y, 
834 F.3d 263, 284 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc).  But there is no 
question that AUSA Hallowell, after having received the color 
copies, promptly shared them with Reyes-Romero’s counsel 
and with the District Court.  That he did so was consistent with 
his Brady obligations as well as good faith in the management 
of the prosecution.  
Nor is there anything to suggest the Government exhibited 
bad faith by producing the color copies months into the 
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prosecution rather than at the outset.  To begin, our precedent 
on the timing of Brady disclosures requires only that the gov-
ernment “make[] [the] evidence available during the course of 
a trial in such a way that a defendant is able effectively to use 
it.”  United States v. Moreno, 727 F.3d 255, 262 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(citation omitted).  Reyes-Romero was certainly able to use the 
color copies of the forms to his benefit; those copies fed into 
the District Court’s decision granting his § 1326(d) motion.  
More to the point, there was no reason why AUSA Hallowell—
or, for that matter, Reyes-Romero’s counsel, who was given an 
opportunity to access or request the original files—could have 
anticipated that the color copies would contain meaningful, rel-
evant evidence that the black-and-white reproductions did not.  
Under those circumstances, AUSA Hallowell lacked “actual or 
constructive possession” of the information contained in the 
color copies, Hollman v. Wilson, 158 F.3d 177, 180 (3d Cir. 
1998), and accordingly that he did not request or produce them 
earlier in the litigation does not give rise to an inference of bad 
faith.   
We end by addressing the assertion that the production of 
black-and-white copies was “a clear implication of conscious 
wrongdoing,” App. 40, on the part of unnamed DHS officials.  
Because the Hyde Amendment is concerned only with prose-
cutorial misconduct, even such unscrupulous conduct by an in-
dependent executive department could not be laid at the pros-
ecution’s feet without a reasonable and logical basis for doing 
so.  Moreover, a review of the record here reveals nothing apart 
from speculation suggesting that DHS’s production of black-
and-white copies was intended to shield Reyes-Romero’s 
A-file from scrutiny—rather than, for instance, being the 
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product of an outdated photocopier or cost-saving printing pro-
cedures.  So thin a reed cannot justify a Hyde Amendment 
award. 
vii. Litigation delay 
Finally, we disagree that the criminal proceeding was “un-
necessarily drawn out by the various litigation tactics taken by 
the Government.”  App. 43.  The time between Reyes-
Romero’s motion to dismiss and the decision granting that mo-
tion was roughly seven and a half months.  If that period is 
longer than in the typical § 1326 prosecution, the reasons are 
many, including the ongoing evolution of Reyes-Romero’s ar-
guments on prejudice, mutual delays in the briefing schedule, 
complicated legal and factual questions and, above all, a will-
ingness on the part of the District Court to hold outstanding 
motions open and solicit supplemental briefing.  Those reasons 
for delay are unexceptional and understandable.  But unwar-
ranted delay on the part of the Government was not one of 
them. 
*          *          * 
Ultimately, with great respect for the District Court and its 
careful administration of this prosecution, we nonetheless con-
clude based on our review of the record that “a mistake has 
been made.”  Heavrin, 330 F.3d at 727 (citation omitted).  
There is no viable evidence that the “position of the United 
States,” as that term is properly understood in the Hyde 
Amendment, was frivolous or in bad faith. 
We share the District Court’s view that Reyes-Romero’s 
2011 expedited removal proceeding deviated from the ordered, 
sensible process we demand of those who enforce the nation’s 
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immigration laws.  Indeed, that is the Government’s view as 
well.  And reasonable minds may differ about precisely how 
the prosecution should have reacted once those issues became 
apparent.  But where reasonable minds may differ, and where 
the Government made objectively reasonable and defensible 
choices throughout the prosecution, there can be no Hyde 
Amendment liability. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will reverse the District Court’s or-
ders awarding Reyes-Romero attorney’s fees and costs under 
the Hyde Amendment. 
